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The economic returns to education in transition countries have been extensively 
evaluated in the literature. The present study contributes to this literature by estimating 
the returns to education in Georgia during the last transition period 2000–04. We find 
very low returns to education in Georgia and little evidence of an increasing trend in the 
returns. This picture contrasts with somewhat higher rates of return to education in the 
mid-1990s in Georgia and the recent estimates from other transition countries. A further 
analysis of the shifts in the supply and demand for education sheds light on possible 
causes. In particular, on the supply side, the decline in the quality of education in the 
1990s has negated the improvements in the provision of skills needed by market 
economies during this period. On the demand side, the expansion of the Georgian 
economy has taken place in the direction of fields such as public administration and 
education that employ a highly educated workforce but do not remunerate well. Yet it 
would be a mistake to conclude that education is not a valuable asset in Georgia. The role 
of education is largely manifested in its impact on the employability of individuals, an 
issue that has been overlooked in the transition literature. Once this impact is taken into 
account, education is shown to play an increasingly important role in influencing the 
earnings of the working population in Georgia. The paper uses the ordinary least squares 
approach, instrumental variables approach, and sample selection correction, taking into 
account conditional and unconditional marginal effects of education on earnings.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The collapse of the socialist bloc initiated an unprecedented transformation of the 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union. As these countries 
embarked on the transition course from socialist to market-based economies, a key 
element, which at the time was viewed to be the guarantor of their success, was their 
highly educated workforce. Yet, twenty years later, on almost all grounds, former Soviet 
Union countries lag behind Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries. Arguably, the 
successful utilization of the skills of the labor force and the creation of incentives for 
their further development have contributed to the superior performance of the CEE 
countries. 
Vast literature has studied the incentives for human capital accumulation existing 
in Central and Eastern European countries (for cross-country analysis and meta-surveys, 
see Fleisher, Peter, and Wang and [2005] and Flabbi, Paternostro, and Tiongson [2008]). 
The research on the former Soviet Union has largely focused on Russia (e.g., Brainerd 
1998; Cheidvasser and Benitez Silva 2007; Vernon 2002) and the western republics of 
the former Soviet Union (e.g., Pastore and Verashchagina [2005] for Belarus; 
Gorodnichenko and Sabirianova Peter [2005] for Ukraine). Exceptions are Arabsheibani 
and Mussurov (2007), who analyze the evidence for Kazakhstan, and Anderson and 
Pomfret (2003), who report the estimates for Kyrgyzstan. 
The present study contributes to this expanding literature by considering the case 
of Georgia. It evaluates the late transition period, covering the years from 2000 to 2004, 
during which the Georgian economy experienced expansion, which was long needed after 
the stagnation of the 1990s. Our main point of interest is to evaluate the extent to which 
the educational attainment of the Georgian workforce has contributed to the increase in 
its earnings. To that end, we estimate the rates of return to education using the Mincerian 
earnings function. We test for and attempt to reduce potential biases in the education 
coefficient by proxying for omitted variables and by implementing instrumental variable 
estimation and the correction for sample selection bias. We first focus on the estimate of 
the education coefficient as a measure of the impact of education on earnings. Doing so 
allows us to place the Georgian results in the context of the transition literature. However,   3
as several recent studies emphasize, in the context of the sample selection corrected 
results, the appropriate measure for comparison is the conditional marginal effect of 
education on the log of earnings. This measure takes into account the impact of education 
on the probability of losing employment for the currently employed category. Finally, we 
estimate the unconditional marginal effect, which evaluates the impact of increased 
education on the earnings of all working individuals, taking into account the change in 
the worker-employment ratio. 
The findings of this paper suggest that educational attainment of the Georgian 
workers has contributed little to their earnings: the returns to education in Georgia are 
very low compared to other transition countries. Moreover, despite the expansion of the 
Georgian economy, there is no evidence of an increasing trend in returns during 2000–
2004. A more careful look at the supply of education reveals that the decline in the 
quality of education in 1990s has negated the improvements in the provision of skills 
needed by market economies. On the demand side, the expansion of the Georgian 
economy has taken place in the direction of industries that employ a highly educated 
workforce, but that do not remunerate well. These forces of supply and demand appear to 
have contributed to the presence of low returns to education and to the lack of an 
increasing trend. This is a disturbing development in so far as the lack of incentives for 
investing into education will deplete the skill level of the workforce, jeopardizing 
Georgia’s long-term economic potential. Yet, it would be a mistake to conclude that 
education is not a valuable asset. The role of education in Georgia is manifested in its 
impact on the employability of individuals, an issue which has been overlooked in the 
transition literature.
2 Once this impact is taken into account, education is shown to play 
an increasingly important role in influencing the earnings of the working population in 
Georgia. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides the background 
for the developments in Georgia’s output composition, the state of its educational system, 
and a brief review of the relevant studies. Section 3 presents the dataset and summary 
                                                 
2 The positive impact of education on the probability of employment has been evaluated for a number of 
European countries (e.g., Harmon, Oosterbeek, and Walker [2001]—cited in Arrazola and de Hevia 
[2008]).   4
statistics. Section 4 describes the variables and presents the methodology, followed by the 





The 1990s were marked by a sharp decline in the standards of living in Georgia. Between 
1991 and 1995, the Georgian GDP shrank from $6.64 billion to $2.4 billion, in 1990 
constant dollars. Since then the Georgian economy has grown; however, fifteen years 
later it still has not reached its pre-1991 GDP levels.  
 




















































































Mining, Manufacturing, Construction and Utilities
Agriculture
Source: UNESCO UIS Data and Georgian Department of Statistics 
 
Although the importance of agriculture has declined, it remains a key industry in 
Georgia, contributing 11% of the GDP in 2008. Service industries have expanded, led by 
the trade sector, which contributed 16.06% of the GDP, and public administration and 
defense which contributed 17.26% of the GDP in 2008.
3 More recently, communications, 
                                                 
3 Services include wholesale and retail trade; hotels and restaurants; and transport, storage, and 
communications (ISIC G–I). Public administration and defense are included in the Other sector, which also 
includes financial intermediation, real estate, education, health, and other community service activities 
(ISIC J–P).   5
transportation, and financial sectors have grown, although their contribution to the GDP 
remains low.
4   
 
2.2. Education 
Simultaneous developments took place in the educational system in Georgia. The state 
financing of education dropped to 0.5% of GDP in 1999. It has since increased, reaching 
3% in 2008, however this level remains well below the average for countries at a similar 
level of development.
5 As a result, the quality of education in Georgia suffered. At the 
primary and secondary levels, the unavailability of textbooks and school materials, 
especially in rural areas, as well as the deferral of building maintenance and reductions in 
teacher salaries became endemic (Vandycke 2001). One study finds that low wages have 
led some teachers to withhold important material during their regular class-time. This 
was done so that they could tutor their students in order to receive additional pay after 
class, and that, too, “with as little effort as possible” (Steiner-Khamsi and Harris-Van 
Keuren 2008: 6). 
 






















Source: UNESCO UIS and Georgian Department of Statistics 
 
                                                 
4 DOS and UN data are consistent with each other, but DOS numbers are more detailed, hence I rely on 
them in this part of the analysis. 
5 As a comparison, the average of OECD countries in 2008 was 6.1% and the average for OECD member 
or partner transition countries in 2005 was 5.1%. These numbers are however comparable to Russia, where 
education spending increased from 2.9% of its GDP in 2000 to 3.8% of its GDP in 2005 (OECD 2008).   6
At the tertiary level, throughout the 1990s and as late as 2004, the majority of 
higher educational institutions lacked necessary facilities and qualified staff. A study 
conducted by the Georgian Ministry of Education in 2004 concluded that out of 178 
licensed higher education institutions, only 78 met the minimum requirements for 
personnel and facilities (cited in Pachuashvili [2007]). Up until the most recent wave of 
educational reforms was initiated in 2004, corruption was widespread at all levels of 
educational attainment (Lorentzen 2000).  
In addition to the changes in quality, the composition of education has changed, 
as well. Since 1990s we have observed a drop in the proportion of students enrolled in 
science and engineering from 56% in 1995 to 14% in 2007. The opposite happened to the 
proportion of students enrolled in business, law, and economics, which increased from 
11% in 1995 to 42% in 2007. These shifts are indicative of the gradual transition away 
from a heavy Soviet emphasis on industrial skill acquisition towards the broader needs of 
a market-based economy, including service- and management-oriented occupations.  
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These adjustments were made possible by the passing of the law allowing the 
establishment of private educational institutions in 1991. As a result, that very year, 48 
private higher education institutions were established, enrolling 10,633 students. By the   7
following year, there were 131 private institutions, enrolling 33,063 students
6 
(Department of Statistics; Pachuashvili 2007).
7 Enrollments reached a peak during 2004 
and have since declined to below the 1990 level. 
 



























Source: Georgian Department of Statistics 
 
Enrollments at the primary levels have changed, as well. The net enrollment ratio 
in primary education
8 deteriorated sharply between 1991 and 2003 compared to middle- 
and high-income countries. In fact, as can be seen from figure 5, Georgia experienced 
one of the worst declines in the primary enrollment in all of the countries of the former 





                                                 
6 By comparison, the enrollment in state higher education institutions dropped from 102,818 students in 
1991 to 90,909 students in 1992. 
7 The very sharp increase can also be attributed to the passing of the Law on Military Service, which 
allowed male individuals enrolled in higher educational institutions to defer their compulsory military 
service. More generally, Bernabe (2002) argues that the lack of employment opportunities was a significant 
contributor to the rise in the enrollment in higher education.  
8 Total enrollment is the number of pupils of the school-age group for primary education, enrolled either in 
primary or secondary education, expressed as a percentage of the total population in that age group. Source: 
United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Institute for Statistics.   8
Figure 5: Net Enrolment Ratios in Primary Education 
 
 
Several studies have evaluated the impact of education on labor market outcomes 
in Georgia. Yemtsov (2001) uses Household Budget Survey data from 1996 and 1997 to 
provide a comprehensive analysis of labor markets with a particular focus on income 
distribution and poverty. His findings emphasize the importance of nonmonetized 
transactions in alleviating the very high levels of inequality in monetary incomes in 
Georgia in mid-1990s. Relevant to this paper, Yemtsov evaluates an earnings function 
with levels of educational attainment and finds that, relative to incomplete secondary 
education, the returns to complete secondary education are about 35% and the returns to 
university education are about 50%. That is, the marginal benefit from university 
education is 15%. 
Bernabe and Stampini (2009) evaluate labor market mobility in Georgia using the 
1998 and 1999 data from the Labor Force Survey
9 and the Household Budget Survey. 
They find that individual characteristics matter in determining the mobility of individuals 
among labor statuses. Pertinent to our analysis, younger individuals are more likely to 
remain unemployed and find it more difficult to find a job once unemployed. Moreover, 
individuals with a university education are more likely to gain and stay in a formal job. 
This particular observation is critical in that it highlights the importance of education in 
                                                 
9 These were the only two years when the LFS was conducted, providing the information necessary to 
conduct the analysis of labor mobility across five different types of employment statuses. 




















Georgia FSU, excluding Georgia CEE  9





The analysis is conducted using the data from the Georgian Household Budget Survey 
(HBS) for 2000–2004. Georgian HBS is a quarterly survey of 3,351 households, which 
follows a rotating panel design, adopted by World Bank’s Living Standards Surveys 
(Deaton 1997). In this analysis, only the first quarter data from each year are used. 
We restrict the sample to individuals 16 years or older and 64 years or younger 
for men and 59 years or younger for women in accordance with the legal retirement age 
of 65 years for men and 60 years for women.
10 We focus our attention on a sample of 
hired workers with positive income. We exclude unemployed individuals, self-employed 
individuals, and employed individuals earning zero income.
11 The group of hired workers 
constitutes 19.79% of the working-age sample. It bears emphasizing that hired 
employment constitutes a relatively small portion of overall employment in Georgia, with 
self-employed individuals being 37.22% of the working-age group and the remaining 
42.99% being either inactive or unemployed. However, focusing on this group enables us 
to place our results in the context of the transition literature, in which almost all studies 
evaluate the returns to education for employees (Noorkoiv et al. [1998] is one exception; 
they include all types of employment). An equally important reason, however, is the 
finding that the labor market experience of self-employed individuals differs from the 
experience of hired workers and therefore merits separate attention (Garcia-Mainar and 
Montuenga-Gomez [2005], for evidence on Spain and Portugal). In particular, the levels 
of income underreporting tend to be much higher for self-employed individuals than for 
workers (Benedek and Orsolya 2009; Johansson 2001). In Georgia, Yemtsov (2001) finds 
                                                 
10 In the sample of individuals above the retirement age, 822 (8.57% of the total number of individuals at or 
above retirement age) report being hired workers. Out of these 822 individuals, 72 report earning zero 
wages. The OLS, IV, and sample selection corrected results are robust to the inclusion of individuals above 
the retirement age. 
11 Employed zero-earning group constitutes 1.8% of the sample. Therefore, unlike other countries, wage 
arrears, in so far they mean zero wage income, are not a common occurrence (Cheidvasser and Benitez 
Silva 2007).   10
that during 1996 and 1997 income was underreported by as much as 46%.
12 Focusing on 
the sample of employees enables us to reduce the bias due to income underreporting. 
 
Table 1: Characteristics of Respondents, 2000–2004 
Variable Working-age  Hired 
Age (years)  36.75  41.51 
Tbilisi
a .2547  .3806 
Urban   .5171  .6886 
Female   .5070  .4686 
Married   .6263  .7083 
Agriculture .2669  .0279 
Wage (in laris)  27.63  82.57 
Education:      
   Incomplete secondary  0.0813  .0288 
   Technical college  .2048  .2419 
   Complete secondary  .3772  .2057 
   Higher education or above  .2271  .4583 
 1.00  1.00 
Number of observations  6,166  31,154 
Notes: 
a proportions unless noted otherwise  
 
Table 1 presents the characteristics of respondents for the working-age group and 
for the hired-worker subsample analyzed in this study. A typical hired worker is about 
five years older, more likely to be a man, and more likely to live in urban area. This 
worker has higher level of education and earns more than three times as much as a typical 
working-age person. A typical hired worker is less likely to work in agriculture compared 
to a typical working-age person. These differences in the characteristics of individuals 
point to a need to account for a potential sample selection bias. 
                                                 
12 By comparison, in 2005 in Hungary 11% of income was unreported, with self-employed not reporting 
67% of their income.   11
In order to better understand the relationship between our key variable of interest 
—education—and other variables in the estimation, we explore how individuals with 
different educational attainment differ from each other. Our first finding is that the 
proportion of hired individuals in the working-age sample rises with educational 
attainment. Only 7.14% of individuals with an incomplete secondary education are hired 
workers. This number for individuals with a university education is 42.93%.
13 Individuals 
with a university education are much more likely to work in urban areas and much less 
likely to work in agriculture. Women are underrepresented in the category of hired 
workers with an incomplete or complete secondary education, but well-represented 
among individuals with a technical or university education. Finally, the earnings of hired 
workers with a university education are almost 50% higher than the earnings of workers 
with an incomplete secondary education. It remains to be seen how these differences in 
earnings by education will persist once we control for other characteristics. 
 















Incomplete secondary      .0714
 a  .1436 .5350  .1504 .3886  61.95 
Complete secondary  .1103 .3717  .6332 .0544 .3315  79.30 
Technical  .2442 .1924  .6422 .0232 .5028  71.09 




Equally important is the look at how individuals employed in different industries 
differ from each other. Based on our sample, more than 20% of hired workers are 
employed in the education sector, followed by public administration, manufacturing, and 
trade. It is noteworthy that over 80% of the hired workers are employed in service-related 
sectors, including trade, hotels, finance, real estate, public administration, education, 
health, culture, and international organizations. 
 
                                                 
13 This relationship also holds if we consider hired individuals as a proportion of the employed (hired + 
self-employed).   12














  0.1644 0.1958 0.2523  59.97 
Mining 0.5  0.8611  0.1546  0.3622  0.6355  86.02 
Manufacturing 10.95  0.7697  0.3108  0.3089  0.7106  100.62 
Power 4.17  0.9885  0.1951  0.3288  0.6010  97.90 
Construction 3.5  0.6034  0.0463  0.3269  0.7365  143.60 
Trade 10.85  0.3202  0.4407  0.2695  0.7688  104.34 
Hotels 2.11  0.8280  0.6118  0.2283  0.7379  109.14 
Transport 8.38  0.6671  0.2477  0.2644  0.7002  119.87 
Finance 1.82  0.9739  0.6143  0.6179  0.7736  122.33 
Real Estate  3.47  0.9106  0.4258  0.5899  0.8168  93.97 
Public 
Administration 
and Defense  16.12  0.9970  0.2816  0.5906  0.6815  72.02 
Education 20.32  0.9882  0.8115  0.7209  0.5992  46.86 
Health 8.25  0.9658  0.8162  0.4357  0.7438  45.12 
Culture 5.22  0.8090  0.5127  0.4456  0.8139  69.92 
Hired Services 
in Households  0.32 0.3636  0.9051  0.3364  0.8784  102.40 
International 
Organizations  0.28 1.0000  0.4938  0.8626  0.7865  352.83 
 100%           
Notes: 
a proportions unless noted otherwise 
 
Close to 100% of individuals in public administration and defense, education, 
health, international organizations, and power industries are hired workers. On the other 
end of the spectrum is agriculture, in which only 2.4% are hired workers. These numbers 
highlight the need to evaluate the determinants of self-employment separately from the 
determinants of hired employment. We also note that education and health industries, as 
well as hired workers in households, are dominated by females. Construction, agriculture, 
mining, and power and utilities are overpowered by males. International organizations, as 
well as finance and education sectors, have the highest proportions of individuals with a 
university education. Agriculture is the only industry in which this value is below 20%. 
With the exception of agriculture, over 60% of employees in all sectors reside in urban 
areas. Finally, we observe a large variation in the earnings of workers in different   13
industries, with agriculture remunerating the least and international organizations paying 
the most. 
 
4. VARIABLES AND METHODOLOGY  
 
The wage variable is the monthly wage from main employment,
14 expressed in Georgian 
laris. The wages are actual rather than contractual and are adjusted for inflation using the 
CPI.  
Education is measured as total years of education or as the levels of education, to 
account for the possibility of nonlinearity in the returns to education at different levels of 
schooling (for more discussion, see Trostel [2005]). Given the unavailability of actual 
years of education, the years of education are imputed from the data on the levels of 
education (Gorodnichenko and Sabirianova Peter [2005]; an important exception is 
Munich, Svejnar, and Terrell [2005]). Experience is proxied by Age–Schooling–6, 
following a common approach in the literature. This measure is admittedly problematic 
as we do not know how long currently employed individuals have in fact been employed.  
To enable the comparison of the Georgian case to the studies of other countries, 
we first use ordinary least squares (OLS) to estimate a Mincerian earnings equation 
(Mincer 1974): 
  
i i i i e X S y + + = α β       ( 1 )  
 
where subscript i denotes individual i, yi stands for the log of inflation-adjusted actual 
monthly wages, Si stands for schooling, β is the schooling coefficient, α is the vector of 
coefficients of variables included in Xi, and ei is the error term. In the basic specification 
Xi includes the intercept, individual i’s years of education, experience, experience 
squared, and female dummy. The alternative specification includes levels of education 
instead of the years of education. In the extended specification Xi includes, in addition, 
                                                 
14 Wages are earnings from main employment. In the working-age group, 491 respondents (1.5% of the 
working-age sample) report earning income from a second job. The mean difference is 0.62 laris and is 
statistically different from zero at the 1% significance level.   14
marriage dummy, interaction term between female dummy and marriage, urban dummy, 
and regional dummy variables. 
The consistency of the OLS coefficient estimates results depends on the absence 
of a correlation between the matrix of regressors and the error term e, that is E(e|X)=0. In 
the presence of nonzero correlation, the coefficient estimates are inconsistent (Card 1999 
and 2001). Omitted variable bias is a common cause of correlation between the regressors 
and the error term. One way we deal with the bias stemming from the omission of 
potentially important variables is by proxying for them. However, in situations in which 
proxying for omitted variables is not possible or when the bias stems from the 
measurement error, the instrumental variable approach provides consistent estimates.  
 
4.1. Instrumental Variables (IV) Approach 
The objective of the IV estimation is to “extract” the portion of the information in the 
education variable, which is not correlated with the error term in the earnings equation, 
therefore reducing the bias. Although the intended benefit is the attainment of 
consistency, the IV approach is costly in that the loss of information results in the loss of 
efficiency. Therefore, the necessity of IV estimation must be carefully assessed. 
We can specify the instrumental variables model with education S as the variables 
we are instrumenting for as a two-equation system, which includes the Mincerian model 
































     (2) 
 
where  i ϑ  is the error term in the first-stage regression, Qi includes exogenous variables in 
Xi, and, in this case, at least one additional exogenous variable (the excluded instrument).  
In order to obtain consistent results, an instrumental variable must be correlated 
with the endogenous variable (relevance) and it must be independent of the error term in 
the main equation (validity or excludability) (Baum, Schaffer, and Stillman 2002 and 
2007; Murray 2006). There is a tradeoff between the relevance and the validity of an 
instrument. The greater the degree of correlation between the instrument and the   15
endogenous variable, the more similar the two are and the less likely it is that the 
instrument is uncorrelated with the dependent variable in the primary equation. Both 
conditions are critical. Bound, Jaeger, and Baker (1995) and Murray (2006) show that 
even when instruments are valid, if they are not relevant enough, the coefficient estimates 
are biased even in large samples, which defeats the purpose of using the IV estimation in 
the first place. Therefore, it is important to assess both the relevance and the validity of 
the instruments.  
 
4.2. Sample Selection Model 
Another potentially critical source of bias stems from the nonrandom selection into the 
sample. A preliminary look at the data suggests that the sample of hired workers is not 
representative of the population, rendering the inference about the returns to education 
potentially inaccurate. In order to evaluate the problem, we specify it in the form of a 
bivariate process that generates two latent variables yi* and gi*, where yi* is the log of 
wage offers wi and gi* is the difference between the wage offer individual i receives, wi, 
and this individual’s reservation wage, w
res






































































i  ,    (3) 
 
where Si stands for schooling and Xi and Zi  are vectors of observations of exogenous 
variables; β is the schooling coefficient and α and γ are the corresponding coefficients of 
Xi and Zi and ε and u are the error terms in the two equations; σ is the standard deviation 
of ε; and ρ is the correlation coefficient between ε and u. In Zi we include schooling, 
exogenous variables in Xi, and at least one additional identifying variable (even though 
under the assumption of the joint normality of ε and u the above system of equation is 
identified even when Zi includes schooling and the variables in Xi). 
  The observed variables are yi and gi such that 
 
   16
yi = yi* if gi*>0; yi=0 otherwise; 
 
gi = 1  if gi*>0; gi=0 otherwise. 
 
This implies that wages are observed and equal wage offers only if the wage offer 
exceeds the person’s reservation wage. If the wage offer a person receives is below this 
person’s reservation wage, the wage offer is unobserved. As Davidson and MacKinnon 
(1993) point out, equation (3) can be rewritten in a one-equation form as: 
 
i i i i i v u X S y + + + = ρσ α β
* .       ( 4 )  
 
If we replace yi* with yi and ui with its mean conditional on gi=1 and on observed 
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Z
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 is the inverse Mills ratio, which represents the probability of a 
employed person becoming unemployed. 
The estimate of β from the OLS estimation of (5) is consistent. We will call it the 
sample selection corrected estimate. It can be interpreted as the mean effect of increased 
education on wage offers, whether they are observed or not. However, in many cases, the 
object of interest is the mean effect of increased education on observed wages, which is 
the conditional marginal effect of education on wages: 
 
), ` (
) 0 | ( 2
*





λ γ λ ρσγ β β + − =
∂
> ∂
=            (6) 
 
where γs is the schooling coefficient in the selection equation.   17
The second term in expression (6) conditions the impact of education to the mean 
of the observed wages. It also underscores that the conditional marginal effect of 
education varies across individuals and depends on their characteristics (Greene 2000). 
The estimated values that we report correspond to the mean values of variables. 
If ρ is zero or if γs is zero, β1 and β equal each other. In most cases γs is positive, 
that is education increases the probability of becoming employed. Then the relationship 
between β1 and β depends on the sign of ρ. Positive ρ implies that the unobservables that 
increase the likelihood of becoming employed also raise wages. Unobserved ability is 
one such example: more-able individuals are more likely to become employed and at the 
same time their earnings are, on average, higher than the earnings of less-able 
individuals. When ρ is positive, the conditional marginal effect is lower than the 
unconditional effect on wage offers. On the other hand, negative ρ implies that the 
unobservable characteristics that increase the likelihood of becoming employed reduce 
wages. Some studies argue, for example, that in circumstances in which employers have 
the leverage in setting wages, the probability of a person being hired depends on this 
person’s willingness to accept lower pay (Nicaise 2001). In such circumstances, the 
conditional marginal effect will be higher than the unconditional effect on wage offers.  
It is noteworthy that in the literature the biased OLS estimates are commonly 
compared to the sample selection corrected estimates of β, even though the appropriate 
measure is β1 (notable exceptions are Arrazola and de Hevia [2008] for Spain and 
Hoffman and Kassouf [2005] for Brazil). 
Equally valuable is the unconditional marginal effect of increased education on 
observed wage earnings. The unconditional marginal effect takes into account the impact 
of increased education on the probability that the currently unemployed or inactive 
individuals will become employed.
15 This is another measure that the literature assessing 
the impact of education in transition countries has not carefully considered. As Hoffman 
and Kassouf (2005) show, the unconditional marginal effect of increased education on 
mean earnings is: 
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5.1 OLS Results 
Table 4 presents the OLS results. All estimations are adjusted with survey weights. The 
basic specification of the Mincerian earnings function results in the rate of return to 
education of 0.0312, indicating that one additional year of education raises earnings by 
3.12%. This value is very low compared to other transition countries. For Russia, using 
household-based survey data, Gorodnichenko and Sabirianova Peter (2005) obtain basic 
OLS estimates of 0.093 and 0.092 in 2000 and 2002. Vernon (2002) obtains the 
equivalent estimate of 0.085 for Russia in 2000. Clark uses a more inclusive specification 
and finds that the returns to education in 1998 in Russia were 0.1186. Using a different 
dataset—the International Social Survey Programme—Flabbi, Paternostro, and Tiongson 
(2008) obtain the basic OLS returns to education of 0.0785 for the late transition period 
covering 1997–2002, reflecting the robustness of the previous results for Russia. Using 
Kazakh household-based survey data from 2001, Arabsheibani and Mussurov (2007) find 
the returns to education of 0.08 for men and 0.115 for women. The results from Ukraine 
are more comparable to the Georgian case: Gorodnichenko and Sabirianova Peter (2002) 
report the estimates of 0.038 and 0.045 for 2000 and 2002. 
  An alternative specification that can enrich our understanding of the sources of 
returns includes the completed levels of education instead of the years of education in the 
estimation (table 4, column 2). The resulting OLS estimate of the returns to completed 
secondary education is .1548.
16 The corresponding estimate for completed technical 
education is .0876
17 and to completed tertiary education is .2753.
18 Hence the marginal 
                                                 
16 The reference group is individuals with primary or incomplete secondary education. 
17 The F-statistic comparing the coefficient estimates of completed secondary and technical education is     
F(2, 5761)=3.54, p-value=0.0291.   19
benefit from acquiring a university education relative to a secondary education is only 
0.1205. Compared to the results from 1996–1997 reported in Yemtsov (2001), returns to 
all levels of educational attainment have declined. In particular, using a more extended 
specification, Yemtsov (2001) finds that the rate of return to completed secondary 
education relative to incomplete secondary education is 0.35, whereas the rate of return to 
the university education is 0.50, yielding the marginal return of 0.15. At both secondary 
and tertiary levels, the decline in the quality of education is the likely culprit explaining 
why, despite the relatively strong performance of the Georgian economy during 2000–
2004,
19 the returns to education dropped to such low levels. Note, however, that the 
marginal returns to a university education relative to a completed secondary education 
remained comparable.  
Placing the Georgian estimates in the context of other former Soviet Union 
countries, Cheidvasser and Benitez Silva (2007) find that the return to a completed 
secondary education in Russia was 0.0567 and the return to a university education was 
0.2842 during 1992–1999 (the marginal increase of 0.2275). Arabsheibani and Mussurov 
(2007) report the returns to a completed secondary education of 0.245 for men and 0.182 
for women. The corresponding estimates for a university education are 0.646 for men and 
0.806 for women, with the marginal increases of 0.401 and 0.624 for men and women, 
respectively. For Belarus, the findings of Pastore and Veraschagina (2005) indicate the 
return of 0.35 for a completed secondary education and 0.93 for a university education 
using 2001 data (the marginal return of 0.58). In sum, the current estimates of the returns 
to different levels of education in Georgia are lower than the Georgian estimates from 
1990s and lower than the estimates from other transition countries for the similar period 
(with the exception of Russia). In addition, whereas the returns to education in other 
transition countries increase with educational attainment (possibly reflecting greater 
variability at the tertiary level), in Georgia during 1996–1997 and more recently during 
2000–2004, the marginal returns to tertiary education appear to be lower than the 
                                                                                                                                                 
18 The F-statistic comparing the coefficient estimates of completed secondary and university education is  
F(2, 5761)=13.09, p-value=0.0000. 
19 The average growth rate of GDP in constant 1990 prices was 3.61%.   20
marginal returns to secondary education.
20 We return to a more careful analysis of this 
question in the second part of the paper. 
As it was already mentioned above, the omission of important variables can cause 
the coefficient estimates in the regression to be biased. Regional dummies are one group 
of potentially important variables. In this estimation, the sample is dominated by 
residents of Tbilisi, who make up 26.07% of the sample and who, on average, are more 
educated than residents of other regions. As a result, omitting regional dummies and 
therefore ignoring the regional sources of variation in wages skews upwards the 
education coefficient estimate.
21 Indeed including regional dummies (as well as marriage 
and the interaction term between marriage and gender) results in a statistically significant 
drop in the education coefficient estimate to 0.0111
22 (table 4, column 3). Earnings in all 
regions are found to be below the earnings in Tbilisi. However, there is evidence of 
substantial regional variability in wage earnings: in Qvemo Qartli wages are only 8% 
below wages in Tbilisi whereas this same differential for Samcxe Javaxeti is 72%.  
The omission of a measure of quality of education and its composition is another 
potentially serious problem, influencing the experience coefficient in particular. The post-
Soviet changes that took place in the quality of education and the composition of the 
Georgian educational system introduce two conflicting forces. On the one hand, because 
the quality of education received during the Soviet period was higher than the quality of 
education received during the 1990s (the period applicable to this analysis), the 
experience coefficient is likely to be overestimated. On the other hand, if the post-Soviet 
educational system provides skills more compatible with the running of a market-based 
economic system, the experience coefficient is likely to be underestimated. The inclusion 
of separate measures for the number of years of Soviet education and the  
 
 
                                                 
20 This result runs is similar to the finding of decreasing returns to education in the vast majority of 
countries (Psacharopoulos and Patrinos 2004). 
21 Note however that the bias is reduced only when the introduced omitted variable is exogenous. Yemtsov 
(2001) points to the very limited regional mobility in Georgia, supporting the assumption of the exogeneity 
of regional dummies. 
22 The adjusted Wald test comparing education coefficient estimates in the basic and extended 
specifications is F(1, 26693)=109.79, p-value 0.0000. Also, the adjusted Wald test comparing all common 
coefficient estimates is F(7, 26687)=3.84, p-value=0.0004.   21
Table 4: Ordinary Least Squares Results 
VARIABLES Basic  Alternative 
(Levels)  




 (1)  (2)  (3)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
Education   0.0312***    0.0111**    0.0115**  0.0106 
 (0.005)    (0.004)    (0.005)  (0.018) 
Secondary 
a     0.1548**         
   (0.069)         
Technical   0.0877         
   (0.068)         
University   0.2753***         
   (0.067)         
Soviet  educ      0.0109**     
      (0.004)     
Post-Soviet  educ      0.0166     
      (0.011)     
Experience    0.0030  0.0042 0.0036 0.0068  0.0065  -0.0321 
  (0.005)  (0.005) (0.004) (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.039) 
Experience2  -0.0001  -0.0002* -0.0002* -0.0002*  -0.0002*  0.0023 
    (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.003) 
Female    -0.6200***  -0.6146*** -0.4302*** -0.4305***  -0.3885***  -0.5192*** 
  (0.025)  (0.026) (0.048) (0.048)  (0.059)  (0.089) 
Marriage       0.1924***  0.1933***  0.2231***  0.1797* 
     (0.045)  (0.045)  (0.054)  (0.103) 
Female* marriage      -0.2329***  -0.2333***  -0.2720***  -0.2595* 
     (0.055)  (0.055)  (0.065)  (0.155) 
Urban       0.1682***  0.1684***  0.1807***  0.0486 
     (0.028)  (0.028)  (0.029)  (0.084) 
Kaxeti
b       -0.5427***  -0.5429***  -0.5237***  -0.7293*** 
     (0.049)  (0.049)  (0.051)  (0.183) 
Qvemo Qartli       -0.0806**  -0.0806**  -0.0763*  -0.0920 
     (0.040)  (0.040)  (0.043)  (0.116) 
Samcxe       -0.7192***  -0.7198***  -0.7121***  -0.7753*** 
     (0.056)  (0.056)  (0.060)  (0.166) 
Achara       -0.0961**  -0.0951**  -0.0922**  -0.1327 
     (0.042)  (0.042)  (0.045)  (0.128) 
Guria       -0.5808***  -0.5806***  -0.5795***  -0.5868*** 
     (0.055)  (0.055)  (0.058)  (0.202) 
Samegrelo       -0.5635***  -0.5634***  -0.5430***  -0.7255*** 
     (0.046)  (0.046)  (0.048)  (0.159) 
Imereti       -0.5016***  -0.5021***  -0.4922***  -0.5623*** 
     (0.040)  (0.040)  (0.043)  (0.114) 
Shida Qartli       -0.3931***  -0.3929***  -0.3658***  -0.6181*** 
     (0.041)  (0.041)  (0.044)  (0.125) 
D2001
 c 0.0646  0.0651  0.0680*  0.0670*  0.0696*  0.0330   22
  (0.042)  (0.042) (0.039) (0.039)  (0.041)  (0.139) 
D2001  0.1847***  0.1833*** 0.1880*** 0.1863***  0.1979***  0.0707 
  (0.042)  (0.042) (0.039) (0.039)  (0.041)  (0.142) 
D2003  0.1682***  0.1675*** 0.1691*** 0.1656***  0.1754***  0.0974 
  (0.040)  (0.040) (0.038) (0.038)  (0.040)  (0.111) 
D2004  0.3644***  0.3652*** 0.3648*** 0.3607***  0.3779***  0.2348** 
  (0.039)  (0.039) (0.037) (0.037)  (0.039)  (0.118) 
Constant  3.7311***  3.9427*** 3.9757*** 3.9368***  3.8821***  4.3481*** 
  (0.081)  (0.080) (0.084) (0.109)  (0.112)  (0.307) 
Observations  5,763  5,763 5,757 5,757  5,143  614 
R-squared 0.137  0.138 0.243 0.243  0.240  0.265 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; 
a omitted category is incomplete 
secondary education;
 b omitted category is Tbilisi; 
c omitted year is 2000. 
 
number of years of post-Soviet education potentially controls for this source of bias (see 
Munich, Svejnar, and Terrell 2005). The resulting impact on the experience is not 
statistically significant (F(1, 26693) = 0.29, p-value = 0.5919) neither is the joint effect 
on all common coefficients (F(18, 26676) = 0.02, p-value = 1.0000). This appears to 
suggest that the improvements in the provision of skills more suitable to the market 
economy have been negated by the decline in the quality of education (table 4, column 
5). This conclusion is further supported by the lack of a statistical difference between the 
returns to Soviet education and the returns to post-Soviet education (F(1, 5756) = 0.29, p-
value = 0.5918).
23 
Another approach to addressing the possible bias in the experience coefficient 
arising from the differences in the quality of education is to consider older and younger 
cohorts separately. If the drop in the quality of education dominates, then the experience 
coefficient should increase when the younger cohort is considered separately. The 
opposite should occur for the older cohort. If the improvements in the composition of 
education dominate then the experience coefficient of younger individuals should be 
lower than the pooled estimate and for the older cohort, the opposite should hold. 
This same approach addresses another source of bias in the experience coefficient 
stemming from the use of Age–Education–6 as a proxy for experience, as it may not 
accurately represent the working experience of individuals. This is so because many 
individuals in the sample may have been intermittently unemployed since the breakdown 
                                                 
23 We arrive at similar conclusions by including a variable measuring the proportion of education acquired 
under the Soviet period.   23
of the Soviet Union. In fact, evidence from Georgia suggests that the probability of 
unemployment during 1990s varied depending on workers’ age. In particular, younger 
individuals were more likely to become unemployed and had a harder time finding a job 
compared to older individuals (Bernabe and Stampini 2008). If so, the experience 
measure of younger individuals is likely to exaggerate their true experience, 
underestimating the experience coefficient in the regression including both young and old 
cohorts. 
To evaluate both of these hypotheses, we break the sample into the cohort of 
younger and older workers. The younger cohort consists of workers born on or after 
1975. These individuals entered the labor force after 1991 once they reached 16 years of 
age. The old cohort includes workers born before 1975. These workers have had some 
work experience during the Soviet period. The estimation shows that the returns to 
experience in the young cohort become negative (albeit insignificant) and in the old 
cohort they increase. These results lend support to the possibility that the improvements 
in the composition of education have overcome the deficiencies of the quality and go 
against the findings of Bernabe and Stampini (2008) that younger individuals were more 
likely to remain unemployed (table 4, columns 6 and 7). However, these estimates are 
insignificant, as is the difference between them and the experience estimate from the 
regression with both young and old cohorts. Also, our finding of negligible tenure effects 
is consistent with some of the work on transition countries (Cheidvasser and Benitez 
Silva 2007), presumably reflecting the unstable nature of the transition process, although 
it might also be an artifact of the measurement error. 
In all specifications, there is a sizable premium to living in urban areas (although, 
as could be expected, it diminishes substantially once regional dummies are introduced). 
Moreover, there are significant gender differences. In particular, women earn less than 
men. Marriage is beneficial to men as their earnings increase by as much as 20% as a 
result of getting married. Women’s earnings as a result of marriage are not statistically 
altered.
24 Note however that without information on the number of hours worked it is not 
possible to assess the welfare consequences of these results. It is conceivable, for 
example, that married men’s earnings are higher than unmarried men’s earnings because 
                                                 
24 Joint effect (female + female*marriage) is not significantly different from zero in all specifications.   24
they work more hours in order to provide for their families. Similarly, married women 
might choose to work fewer hours, especially once they have children, but earn more per 
hour. 
Despite the above attempts to control for the omitted variable bias, it is likely that 
the bias remains. Measurement error, for example, has been shown to be an important 
source of correlation between the matrix of regressors and the error term, especially in 
the household survey data (Griliches 1977). Its consequence is the attenuation bias: the 
tendency to underestimate the true coefficient. It is likely to apply to all the variables in 
the sample. In addition, in the case of the education variable, the ability bias and the 
discount bias can affect the coefficient estimates as well (both are examples of the 
omitted variable bias). The ability bias results in an overestimated coefficient, as ability 
and education are likely to be positively correlated. The discount bias, which has received 
much less attention in the literature, occurs when individuals differ in their marginal rates 
of substitution between present and future earnings. Those with a higher discount rate 
will choose less education, as future earnings are less valuable to them. Not taking 
explicit account of the differences in the discount rate will result in underestimated 
coefficients (Harmon, Oosterbeek, and Walker 2003; Card 1999). In the absence of 
variables to control for these sources of bias, we use instrumental variable estimation, 
treating education as the sole variable correlated with the error term to which the 
instrumental variable treatment is applied. 
 
5.2 IV Estimation and Results 
Instrumental variables in the education literature fall into two broad categories: 
background variables, such as parental or sibling education and occupation; and 
institutional variables, such as changes in the compulsory years of education, school 
proximity, and the cost of education (Card 2001). Even when valid, institutional variables 
are often irrelevant (Stock, Wright, and Yogo 2002). On the other hand, background 
variables, while relevant, are often invalid (Rischall 1999). Given the prevalence of 
nepotism and the importance of connections in determining economic success in Georgia 
(Kochladze and Gujaradze 2006), family background variables such as parents’ education   25
or income level are likely to directly influence children’s earnings. In such circumstances, 
institutional instrumental variables promise to be a better tool.  
The two institutional instrumental variables constructed in this study are based on 
Soviet educational reforms, as the majority of the individuals in the sample received their 
formative education during the Soviet period. More specifically, 69.62%of the working-
age sample was born before 1975 and thus received their higher education prior to the 
collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 (22,073 out of 31,703 individuals in the sample). 
Further focusing on hired workers, 89.41% of the hired workers were born before 1975 
(6,004 out of 6,715 individuals). 
 
Table 5: First-stage and Second-stage IV Results 
VARIABLES IV  IV 
  First Stage  Second Stage 
Education   0.0199** 
   (0.009) 
Experience 0.1096***  0.0037 
 (0.011)  (0.004) 
Experience
2 -0.0090***  -0.0001* 
 (0.000)  (0.000) 
Marriage 0.6492***  0.1503*** 
 (0.122)  (0.041) 
Female 0.9387***  -0.4548*** 
 (0.130)  (0.044) 
Female*Marriage -0.5631***  -0.1962*** 
 (0.146)  (0.050) 
Urban 0.2647***  0.1299*** 
 (0.071)  (0.026) 
Kaxeti
a -0.7049***  -0.5529*** 
 (0.125)  (0.046) 
Qvemo Qartli  -0.5263***  -0.1212*** 
 (0.118)  (0.040) 
Samcxe -0.6359***  -0.7192*** 
 (0.139)  (0.054) 
Achara -0.4791***  -0.1286*** 
 (0.109)  (0.041) 
Guria -0.2777*  -0.6009*** 
 (0.152)  (0.054) 
Samegrelo -0.4781***  -0.5679*** 
 (0.124)  (0.046) 
Imereti -0.4057***  -0.5121*** 
 (0.102)  (0.038)   26
Shida Qartli  -0.5820***  -0.3750*** 
 (0.105)  (0.039) 
D2001
b 0.2482***  0.0629* 
 (0.093)  (0.035) 
D2002 0.5955***  0.1838*** 
 (0.095)  (0.036) 
D2003 0.9508***  0.1836*** 
 (0.092)  (0.034) 
D2004 1.1341***  0.3673*** 
 (0.093)  (0.033) 
Dfee -2.8912***   
 (0.137)   
D5948 -3.8068***   
 (0.067)   
Constant 50.0926***  3.8970*** 
 (0.629)  (0.135) 
Observations 5,757  5,757 
Centered R-squared  0.3442  0.236 
First-stage partial R-squared    0.2412 
First-stage F(2,5736)    1863.58 
(0.000) 
Hansen J statistic 





(endogeneity of schooling) 
 1.291 
(0.25584) 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; 
aomitted category is Tbilisi;
 
b omitted year is 2000.   
 
The first instrumental variable is based on the reforms of 1958 and 1964 that 
affected the number of compulsory years of education. The instruments in Cheidvasser 
and Benitez Silva (2006) are based on these reforms as well; however, given the 
peculiarities of the Georgian case, our instruments differ from theirs. The second 
instrument is unique to this study. It is based on the elimination of the upper secondary 
and tertiary tuition fees in 1956 (for further details on the construction of instruments, see 
appendix A1).  
The efficiency of the results and the validity of the standard tests for endogeneity 
of instrumental variables are based on the assumption of homoscedasticity. The 
White/Koenker test points to the presence of heteroscedasticity (see Baum, Schaffer, and 
Stillman 2002 and 2007). Therefore, we run a Generalized Method of Moments (GMM)   27
IV estimation of the model despite its poorer small-sample properties (Baum, Schaffer, 
and Stillman 2002 and 2007). 
  The relevance of the instruments is assessed with partial R
2 from the first stage 
regression, in which only the instruments are included (“partialled-out” R
2) (Bound, 
Jaeger, and Baker 1995). The R
2 of 0.2412 indicates that the instruments are relevant. 
The F-statistic for the joint significance of the instruments in the first-stage regression 
provides an additional piece of information. Staiger and Stock (1997) recommend that the 
F-statistic be at least 10. The value of the F-statistic—F(2, 5736)—in the estimation is 
1863.58, corroborating the relevance of the instruments. The validity of the instruments is 
assessed using the J-statistic of Hansen (1982) for overidentifying restrictions. The 
hypothesis of excludability of instruments cannot be rejected at 10% significance level 
(the J-statistic is 2.477 with the p-value of 0.1155). 
Once the relevance and validity of the instruments is established, the endogeneity 
of the education variable is assessed. We initially tested for the endogeneity of the 
education variable using the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test. However, as Baum, Schaffer, and 
Stillman (2002 and 2007) point out, this test in the context of the heteroscedasticity-
robust GMM estimation often results in a negative statistic, which happened in our case. 
The use of the C-test avoids this problem. We cannot reject the hypothesis of exogeneity 
of the education variable at any reasonable significance level (the value of the chi-
squared statistic is 1.291 and p-value of 0.25584). 
These results suggest that the OLS coefficients are consistent and instrumenting 
for education is not necessary (Harmon, Oosterback, and Walker 2003). The IV 




5.3 Sample Selection Estimation and Results 
Next, we evaluate the presence of the sample selection bias. The literature commonly 
corrects for sample selection bias exclusively for women, the explanation being that the 
reservation wages are meant to reflect the opportunity cost of household production, 
presumably a woman’s domain. However, the reservation wages into hired work also 
                                                 
25 For corresponding results for each year, including the tests for relevance and validity, see table A2.   28
reflect the opportunity cost of self-employment. Moreover, the employment status of an 
individual reflects the decisions made not only by workers, but also by employers and 
these decisions influence both men and women. Therefore, it becomes necessary to test 
and correct for the sample selection bias for the whole sample, including men and 
women, which is what we do in this study. 
The consistency of the sample selection corrected estimator depends on the 
identifiability of the system of equations in (3). Even though the system is identified 
under the assumption of the joint normality of the error terms in the two equations, to 
ensure identifiability we use the number of children under 16 and the interaction term 
between the number of children under 16 and the female dummy as additional variables 
in Zi. The interaction term is intended to capture the gender differences in the impact of 
children on workers’ employment status. While the number of children under sixteen is 
likely to influence the probability of individual’s employment (for women, in particular), 
it is less likely that the variable measuring the number of children under six (another 
commonly used instrument) will influence their wages directly. Indeed, these identifying 
variables were both relevant (first-stage F(2, 26692) = 13.42, p-value = 0.0000) and valid 
(the adjusted Wald statistic testing the hypothesis that the instruments belong in the wage 
equation is F(2, 26692) = 2.04 with p-value of 0.1304).
 26 
The evidence strongly indicates the presence of sample selection: the adjusted 
Wald statistic testing the equality of ρ to 0 is F(1, 26693) = 6.69, p-value = 0.0097. The 
sample selection corrected coefficient in the earnings equation, β, is 0.0522, that is an 
additional year of schooling raises potential wages (wage offers) by 5.22%. This increase 
compared to the OLS coefficient of 0.0111 is at least in part a reflection of the rising 
employment ratio with respect to educational attainment (see table 2). Less-educated 
individuals are disproportionately underrepresented in the sample, hence skewing the 
coefficient in the wage offer equation, in which observed and unobserved wage offers are 
present. Placing these numbers into the context of the literature, Cheidvasser and Benitez 
Silva (2007) report the sample selection corrected estimate of 0.0402 for Russia during 
1992–1999. They, too, find an increase in the coefficient as a result of sample selection 
                                                 
26 Number of children under six and number of elderly over sixty-five, commonly used in the literature as 
identifying variables, were found to be nonexcludable, as was marriage, another commonly used 
instrument, which in the paper is included in the earnings equation.   29
correction, however their increase is negligible. On the other hand, Clark (2003) observes 
a drop in the education coefficient estimate as a result for the sample selection correction. 
Arabsheibani and Mussurov (2007) also report a drop in the sample selection corrected 
IV coefficient for married women down to 0.137. 
As it was previously pointed out, the appropriate measure to which to compare the 
OLS coefficients is the conditional marginal effect of education on earnings, β1, which in 
our case equals 0.0069 and is statistically insignificant. Note that it is relatively close to 
the OLS estimate βols  of 0.0011, even though we find a strong presence of sample 
selection. The estimate of β1  reinforces the OLS finding of the very low benefit from 
education for the currently employed workers. At the same time, the observation that the 
estimate of β1 is lower than the sample selection corrected estimate of the education 
coefficient, β, indicates that a random individual drawn from the population would gain 
proportionately more from an additional year of education than a typical currently 
employed individual would (Arrazola and de Hevia 2008). 
 
Table 6: Returns to Education in the Extended Specification 
 
 OLS  IV  β  β 1  β 2 
pooled 0.0111***  0.0199**  0.0522***  0.0069  0.1592*** 
 (0.004)  (0.009)  (0.017)  (0.005)  (0.005) 
2000 0.0035  0.0112  -0.0987***  0.0150  0.1656*** 
 (0.011)  (0.021)  (0.017)  (0.011)  (0.011) 
2001 0.0062  0.0441**  0.0679***  -0.0005  0.1298*** 
 (0.010)  (0.018)  (0.017)  (0.010)  (0.011) 
2002 0.0168  0.0047  -0.0011  0.0187*  0.1565*** 
 (0.010)  (0.020)  (0.017)  (0.010)  (0.012) 
2003 0.0061  0.0236  0.0446**  0.0021  0.1763*** 
 (0.009)  (0.019)  (0.019)  (0.010)  (0.010) 
2004 0.0280***  0.0218  -0.0411**  0.0355***  0.1774*** 
 (0.009)  (0.018)  (0.017)  (0.009)  (0.010) 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; β is sample 
selection corrected education coefficient, β 1 is conditional marginal effect and β 2 
is the unconditional marginal effect. 
 
Our key conclusion so far is that education has very little influence on the 
earnings of workers in Georgia (conditional on their working status). However, looking at 
the estimate of the unconditional marginal effect of education on earnings, β2, we observe   30
the role that education does play in Georgia: higher educational attainment increases the 
proportion of working-age individuals who are employed, hence raising the proportion of 
people earning any positive wage. More specifically, the unconditional marginal effect of 
education in Georgia is 0.1592, that is one additional year of education raises the mean 
earnings of employed individuals by 15.92%. This increase comes almost entirely due to 
the impact of education on the proportion of employed individuals.  
In the absence of comparison for other transition countries, we place these results 
in the context of two studies analyzing the cases of Brazil and Spain. Hoffmann and 
Kassouf (2005) evaluate a sample of Brazilian women using the data from 1999. Their 
findings indicate that the sample selection corrected education coefficient (β) is higher at 
0.1165 than the OLS estimate of 0.1106 (βols) and higher than the conditional marginal 
effect of 0.1095 (β1). Their unconditional marginal effect of 0.1606 (β2) is the highest of 
the three. In the Spanish case, using the data from 2000, Arrazola and de Hevia (2008) 
find that the sample selection corrected estimate of 0.081 (β) is higher than conditional 
marginal effect of education of 0.074 (β1).
27 The unconditional effect (β2) is again the 
highest than 0.166. Compared to both Brazil and Spain, education appears to have very 
little direct impact on the earnings of working individuals in Georgia. However, the large 
impact of education on the probability of becoming a hired worker compensates for the 
low returns to education conditional on being employed, so much so that the 
unconditional marginal effect of education on earnings in all three cases is around 0.16. 
  A similar situation applies to experience. Its primary impact on earnings is via the 
increase in the probability of employment. One additional year of education raises the 
unconditional mean of earnings by 7.77%. Once employed, the impact of experience is 
negligible. The insignificance of experience has been demonstrated in other studies as 






                                                 
27 Arrazola and de Hevia (2008) do not report OLS results.   31
Table 7: Returns to Experience in the Extended Specification 
 
 OLS  IV  β  β 1  β 2 
pooled 0.0036***  0.0037  0.0242**  0.0020  0.0777*** 
  (0.000) (0.004) (0.009) (0.004)  (0.004) 
2000 -0.0010**  0.0006  -0.0534*** 0.0033  0.0817*** 
  (0.000) (0.009) (0.012) (0.010)  (0.008) 
2001  0.0046*** 0.0003  0.0487*** 0.0019  0.0893*** 
  (0.000) (0.009) (0.014) (0.010)  (0.008) 
2002 -0.0037*** 0.0008  -0.0145  -0.0028  0.0899*** 
  (0.000) (0.011) (0.015) (0.012)  (0.009) 
2003 0.0016***  -0.0004  0.0148  0.0004  0.0596*** 
  (0.000) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008)  (0.008) 
2004 0.0125***  0.0139*  -0.0158  0.0138  0.0684*** 
  (0.000) (0.008) (0.012) (0.009)  (0.008) 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; β is sample 
selection corrected education coefficient, β 1 is conditional marginal effect and β 2 
is the unconditional marginal effect. 
 
 
6. ANALYSIS OF THE RESULTS 
 
The low estimates of returns to education in Georgia are puzzling, especially in the 
background of an expanding economy. Equally puzzling appears to be the lack of an 
increasing trend during 2000–2004, as can be seen from table 6. The OLS results, the IV 
results, the sample selection corrected education coefficient, and conditional marginal 
effects hardly present a story of rising rates of return.
28 The only evidence of dynamism 
emerges in the increased impact of education on earnings after taking into account the 
probability of becoming a hired worker (unconditional marginal effect β2). Note that the 
probability itself has not increased, however rising real wages contributed to the increase 
(see table A4). 
To investigate the causes of the stagnant situation, we explore the shifts that have 
taken place in the supply and demand for education. 
 
 
                                                 
28 Similar to pooled results, OLS results for each year tend to be lower than IV results, as well as sample 
selection corrected results. See the appendix for full OLS, IV, and sample selection corrected results.   32
6.1 Supply 
To better understand the supply-side forces, we reestimate using the sample selection 
estimation the extended model with the years of Soviet and post-Soviet education. 
Similar to the OLS specification, sample selection corrected coefficients are not 
statistically different from each other (table 8).
29 Neither are the conditional marginal 
effects of education. However, differences emerge between unconditional marginal 
effects. Soviet education appears to have a greater impact on the earnings by raising the 
probability of being employed much more so than post-Soviet education does (see first-
stage results in table A5).
30 In fact, if anything, the overall impact of Soviet education 
during 2000–2004 appears to have increased, while the same cannot be said about post-
Soviet education. This implies that while the proportion of the population with Soviet 
education is diminishing, the new generation of the workforce has not yet successfully 
substituted for it, explaining the absence of an increase in the returns to education. 
Using another angle to understand the supply-side changes, we reestimate the 
sample selection corrected model with levels of education instead of the years of 
education (table 9).
31 After the correction for sample selection bias, the conditional 
marginal effects of completed secondary and technical education turn insignificant. The 
conditional marginal effect of university education drops to only 0.1006, but remains 
marginally significant at 10%. Hence, we observe low returns to education at every level 
of educational attainment. The key finding however yet again lies in the differences 
observed in the unconditional marginal effect. University education pays off substantially 
as the earnings of workers rise by 131.75% (relative to incomplete secondary education) 
as a result of obtaining university education once the change in the proportion of 
individuals hired is taken into account. This number is compared to 14.26% for 
completed secondary education and 63.15% for completed technical education. Most of 
these gains appear to have taken place in 2003 and 2004, potentially pointing to shifts in 
the impact of education. 
 
                                                 
29 F(1, 26693) = 0.09, p-value=0.7659. 
30 The difference between the Soviet education and post-Soviet education coefficient estimates in the first-
stage Probit is significant at 1% for pooled estimation and for each year. 
31 The full set of results is available upon request.   33
6.2 Demand 
Looking at the developments on the demand side, the Georgian GDP in constant 1990 
dollars expanded at an average rate of 6% during 2000–2004. Therefore, it might seem 
puzzling that the returns to education have not increased. However, a more careful look at 
the situation reveals possible reasons. 
Two distinct groups of industries can be identified in explaining the expansion of 
the Georgian GDP during 2000–2004. The first group includes heavily or completely 
state-financed industries, which are public administration, healthcare, social services, and 
education, with wages largely set by the government. Together they employed 45.47% of 
hired workforce. The second group includes trade (employing 10.26% of hired 
workforce) and financial intermediation, communications, real estate, transport storage 
and communications, and construction (with joint 16.79% of the hired workforce). The 
proportion of workers with a university degree in the first group of industries is among 
the highest of all the industries in Georgia. Yet, the degree of remuneration in these 
industries is ahead of only agriculture (table 2). The second group, on the other hand, 
employs a well-educated workforce and pays above average wages. However, its 
proportion of employment is relatively low. Therefore, it appears that the Georgian 
economy during 2000–2004 was largely expanding in the direction of largely state-
financed industries employing a highly educated workforce, but paying relatively low 
wages.    34
Table 8: Returns to Soviet and post-Soviet Education in the Extended Model 
 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; β is sample selection corrected education coefficient, β 1 










  Soviet Education  Post-Soviet Education 
 OLS  β  β 1  β 2  OLS  β  β 1  β 2 
pooled  0.0109**  0.0484**  0.0072 0.1590***  0.0166  0.0448** 0.0146  0.1182*** 
  (0.004)  (0.020)  (0.005)  (0.005) (0.011) (0.018) (0.011) (0.011) 
2000  0.0015  -0.1001***  0.0133  0.1654***  0.0466* -0.0370 0.0488* 0.1329*** 
  (0.011)  (0.017)  (0.011)  (0.011) (0.028) (0.034) (0.028) (0.025) 
2001  0.0060  0.0664***  -0.0003  0.1298***  0.0105 0.0413 0.0082 0.0661** 
  (0.010)  (0.018)  (0.010)  (0.011) (0.031) (0.032) (0.030) (0.028) 
2002  0.0167  0.0015  0.0183*  0.1555***  0.0209 0.0125 0.0213 0.0830*** 
  (0.010)  (0.016)  (0.010)  (0.012) (0.030) (0.031) (0.030) (0.029) 
2003  0.0056  0.0442**  0.0016  0.1770***  0.0163 0.0399 0.0151 0.1057*** 
  (0.010)  (0.019)  (0.010)  (0.010) (0.022) (0.025) (0.022) (0.024) 
2004  0.0280***  -0.0402**  0.0353***  0.1774***  0.0284 -0.0107  0.0303 0.0984*** 
  (0.009)  (0.018)  (0.009)  (0.010) (0.025) (0.027) (0.024) (0.024)   35
Table 9: Sample Selection Corrected Returns to Levels of Education in the Extended Model 
  Completed secondary  Technical  University 
 OLS  β  β 1  β 2  OLS  β  β 1  β 2  OLS  β  β 1  β 2 
pooled  0.1548**  0.1050  0.0699 0.1426***  0.0877  0.1886** 0.0325  0.6315***  0.2753*** 0.4020*** 0.1006*  1.3175*** 
  (0.069) (0.066) (0.062)  (0.049)  (0.068)  (0.094)  (0.062)  (0.062) (0.067)  (0.144)  (0.061)  (0.067) 
2000  0.0712 0.0606 0.0611  0.0119  -0.0027  -0.3421**  -0.0194  0.4800***  0.0466  -0.6242***  0.0647  1.1655*** 
  (0.139) (0.163) (0.140)  (0.098)  (0.138)  (0.168)  (0.141)  (0.119) (0.138)  (0.181)  (0.141)  (0.132) 
2001  -0.1083 -0.0894 -0.0857  -0.0239  -0.1656  0.0799  -0.1330  0.4139***  -0.0757  0.3627**  -0.0702  0.9558*** 
  (0.133) (0.145) (0.135)  (0.103)  (0.131)  (0.151)  (0.132)  (0.123) (0.128)  (0.172)  (0.130)  (0.135) 
2002  0.1597  -0.0239  0.1403  0.1591  0.2279 0.1760 0.2266  0.7276***  0.2581* 0.9558***  0.1669  0.2591* 
  (0.147) (0.103) (0.147)  (0.146)  (0.145)  (0.153)  (0.144)  (0.174) (0.145)  (0.135)  (0.172)  (0.144) 
2003  0.2600*  0.3237**  0.2658* 0.2652**  0.1633  0.3438**  0.1746  0.7736*** 0.2253*  0.5581***  0.2256* 1.6123*** 
  (0.139) (0.144) (0.139)  (0.108)  (0.141)  (0.156)  (0.141)  (0.145) (0.136)  (0.185)  (0.137)  (0.149) 
2004 0.1136  -0.0404  0.1003  0.3333*** 0.0722  -0.3009**  0.0468  0.9298***  0.2292*  -0.3539** 0.2168*  1.6860*** 
  (0.121) (0.134) (0.121)  (0.108)  (0.120)  (0.149)  (0.120)  (0.140) (0.118)  (0.175)  (0.119)  (0.146) 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; β is sample selection corrected education coefficient, β 1 
is conditional marginal effect and β 2 is the unconditional marginal effect. To further explore this hypothesis, we include industrial dummies in the sample 
selection corrected model.
32 If the hypothesis above is correct, controlling for industries, 
the education coefficient should increase compared to the sample selection corrected 
model without industrial dummies (table 7). As can be seen from table 10, this is in fact 
what we observe.
33 Note however that although the estimates of the returns to education 
rise, they still remain below the estimates from other countries.
34 
 
Table 10: Returns to Education in the Extended Model with Industrial Dummies 
 OLS  β  β 1  β 2 
pooled 0.0431***  0.0844***  .0389***  .1543*** 
 (0.005)  (0.012)  (.0047)  (.0050) 
2000 0.0358***  -0.0564***  0.0431***  0.1455*** 
 (0.011)  -0.017  -0.011  -0.011 
2001 0.0246**  0.0815***  0.0186*  0.1218*** 
 (0.010)  -0.016  -0.01  -0.012 
2002 0.0592***  0.0304  0.0621***  0.1569*** 
 (0.011)  -0.066  -0.013  -0.012 
2003 0.0409***  0.0769***  0.0371***  0.1809*** 
 (0.009)  -0.015  -0.009  -0.011 
2004 0.0662***  0.0009  0.0720***  0.1726*** 
 (0.010)  -0.017  -0.01  -0.011 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1; β is sample selection corrected education coefficient, β 1 is 
conditional marginal effect, and β 2 is the unconditional marginal 
effect. 
 
One important caveat that applies to the analysis of our results has to do with 
income underreporting in certain industries. In particular, Yemtsov (2001) reports that 
health and public administration were particularly susceptible to underreporting in 
Georgia in the mid-1990s. If such a situation persisted during 2000–2004, this would 
provide an additional explanation for the low estimates of the returns to education. 
                                                 
32 In interpreting the results of the model with industrial dummies, we have to be mindful of the potential 
endogeneity of the introduced dummies, as wages can be important determinants of the choice of the 
industry. For a discussion on the inclusion of industrial and occupational dummies, see Munich, Svejnar, 
and Terrell (2005) and Campos and Jolliffe (2003). 
33 The results are robust to the specification with hired households and international sectors dropped from 
the estimation. The full set of the results reported in table 10 are available upon request. 
34 Note however that the estimates from the model with industrial dummies are not fully comparable to the 
estimates from other studies reported in section 5.1. The reported estimates from other studies were 
obtained using basic or extended specifications without industrial dummy variables.   37
7. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The economic returns to education have been extensively evaluated in the literature. 
More recent literature has focused on the case of transition countries. The present study 
estimates the returns to education in Georgia during 2000–2004. We find very low 
returns to education in Georgia and there is little evidence of an increasing trend in the 
returns. This picture contrasts with somewhat higher rates of return to education in the 
mid-1990s in Georgia and the recent estimates from other transition countries. 
The analysis of the factors responsible for the low returns reveals that post-Soviet 
education yields a lower impact compared to the education acquired during Soviet times, 
indicating that the post-Soviet educational system has not yet provided a competitive 
alternative to Soviet education. The changes that took place in the output composition are 
also responsible for the relatively low returns to education. During 2000–2004 the 
Georgian economy expanded in the direction of industries, such as public administration 
and education that employ a skilled workforce, but remunerate relatively poorly. 
Despite the seemingly pessimistic picture, education is found to be of value in 
Georgia. Currently its key role in Georgia lies in providing higher chances of finding a 
job rather than in raising the wages of workers who already hold jobs. In particular, 
having a university degree is found to have the highest impact on the probability of 
finding a job. Similarly, the impact of experience on wages is manifested largely in 
workers having a higher probability of finding jobs. These results could be due to the 
relatively slow process of job creation in Georgia.  
Since 2005, reforms have taken place in the education sector and in the business 
sector that may change the described trends. In particular, investments into the physical 
infrastructure of schools have increased and efforts have been made to rid the educational 
system of corruption and to generally transform it (Pachuashvili 2007). The new 
comprehensive university entrance test was introduced in 2005, which effectively 
eliminated corruption at the entry-level into the higher education. These changes will 
likely lead to improvements in the quality of education in Georgia. Moreover, the 
changes in the business environment, including the new labor code passed in 2006 and 
the simplification of the procedures for setting up businesses introduced in 2005, should   38
contribute to the expansion of the private sector. To the extent that the improvements in 
the quality of education result in the increased productivity of the workforce and the 
expansion of the private sector results in increased demand for a skilled workforce, we 
can expect an increase in the returns to education. However it remains to be seen whether 
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APPENDIX 
 
A1. Soviet Educational Reforms and Instrumental Variables 
The specific elements of the Soviet educational reforms relevant to this study are the 
changes in: 1) the number of compulsory years of schooling, and 2) the cost of education. 
The set of reforms that introduced compulsory education into the Soviet 
educational system originated in 1931 when Soviet planners introduced the four-year 
compulsory education. This development was followed by a move to the seven-year 
compulsory education in 1949, after World War II (Kaser 1986). The 1958 Law on 
Education passed during Nikita Khruschev’s leadership further increased the number of 
compulsory schooling years to eight. The main objective of the 1958 Law on Education 
was to bridge the perceived rift between theoretical knowledge acquired in classroom and 
the practical needs of the economy. Khruschev’s position was that the acquisition of 
practical skills was to have priority over the development of academic knowledge. To 
achieve this objective, the number of secondary schooling years was increased from ten 
to eleven years, with the eleventh year providing opportunities for developing practical 
skills (Schlesinger 1959). However, this reform proved to be unpopular and was followed 
by the 1964 Law on Education, which retracted many of the changes introduced in 1958, 
in particular that of the increase in the number of schooling years from ten to eleven. 
Despite the standardized nature of the Soviet educational system, in some cases, 
there was substantial regional variation in the implementation of reforms (Bilinsky 1962, 
1964, and 1968). For example, following the reform of 1964, in Georgia (and the Baltic 
States), the commitment to the teaching of the native language resulted in the 
introduction of the additional year to the bottom of the grid (Schlesinger 1959: 434; 
Bilinsky 1962: 145). Thus, instead of seven years of age, children in these republics 
entered school at the age of six. Consequently, the number of schooling years remained at 
eleven after 1964 (except that now the additional year was added to the bottom of the grid 
instead of the top) (Bilinsky 1958: 424; Vardys 1967: 61). Moreover, as a result of 
adding a year to the bottom of the grid, the number of compulsory years of education 
became nine instead of eight.   46
The second set of reforms relevant to this paper deals with the private costs of 
education. The Soviet system of education oscillated between the need to produce highly 
skilled workers and the necessity of producing a labor force willing and able to work at 
factories. In an attempt to control the numbers of individuals pursuing upper secondary 
and tertiary education, in 1940, tuition fees were introduced for secondary education 
beyond the at-the-time compulsory seven years of secondary schooling and for tertiary 
education. World War II changed Soviet population dynamics, leading to a shortage of 
applicants desiring to pursue upper secondary and tertiary education. As a result, in 1956 
all fees were abolished (Kaser 1986; Bereday, Brickman, and Read 1960: 190).  
 
Instrumental variable D4859 
The practical implementation of the switch to eight years of compulsory education as a 
result of the 1958 reform took several years and the first class that completed eight 
compulsory years was the class of 1963 (Romanova 2003). These were individuals who 
were 14 years old as of September 1, 1962 (the beginning of the school year), thus 
individuals born before September 1, 1948. The information about the birth month of the 
respondents is not available and consequently, in constructing the instrumental variable, 
it is assumed that all individuals born in 1948 were in the eighth grade as of September 1, 
1962. Moreover, as pointed out, unlike most other Soviet republics where the number of 
compulsory schooling years remained at eight years after the 1964 educational reform, in 
Georgia, a further increase of the number of compulsory years to nine years occurred due 
to the reduction in the age of students at the entry from seven to six years old as of 
September of 1965. Thus children born in 1959 and after received nine compulsory years 
of education. 
In constructing this instrumental variable, we assign the value of seven to 
individuals born before 1948. To individuals born between 1948 and 1958 (including 
1958), the assigned value is eight. Finally, individuals born in 1959 and after are assigned 
the value of nine. As a result, 10.89% of the working-age sample falls into the first 
category, 22.57% falls into the second category, and 66.53% falls into the third.   47
When focusing on the restricted sample (excluding self-employed, unemployed, 
and zero-earning employed), 12.78% fall into the first category, 31.94% into the second, 
and 55.27% into the third. 
This variable can be expected to correlate with the years of schooling since that 
variable was constructed by using the same information about the reforms. However, the 
degree of correlation is not likely to present any problems, as the Pearson correlation 
coefficient between D5948 and the education variable is only 0.0413. 
 
Instrumental variable D42 
The transition to eleven years of secondary education as a result of the 1958 reform also 
took several years. The first affected class were individuals who were entering tenth 
grade in September of 1958 (they were sixteen in 1958 and were born in 1942). 
Therefore, these individuals would graduate at the end of the 1959–1960 academic year. 
However, it was only by 1963 that all schools adopted the eleven-year course load 
(Romanova 2003). As pointed out above, unlike in most Soviet republics, in Georgia, the 
reform of 1964 did not result in the move back to the ten-year system, as the additional 
year was added to the bottom of the educational grid. Therefore, the Georgian school 
maintained an eleven-year system.  
In 2004, the Georgian Ministry of Education and Science implemented a reform 
raising the number of years to twelve. However, these reforms were retracted before any 
class could graduate. Even if fully implemented, these reforms would not have affected 
our sample. 
In summary, the value of the dummy D42 is 0 for individuals born before 1942 
and is 1 for those born in and after 1942. As a result, in the restricted sample, 4.59% fall 
into the 0 category and 95.41% into the 1 category. 
 
Instrumental variable Dfee 
Individuals affected by the elimination of the fees in 1956 were those who were in 
seventh grade at the beginning of the school year on September 1. These were individuals 
who were thirteen at the time, thus born in 1943 and after.    48
Another major wave of changes in the private cost of tuition occurred in 1991 
with the establishment of fee-based private higher education institutions and in 1993 with 
the introduction of fees at state higher education institutions in 1993. However, unlike the 
1956 change, these changes cannot be included as an instrumental variable or its 
component. This is so because we cannot claim that the 1991 changes affected wages 
exclusively through the education variable. Although tuition fees are one aspect of the 
changes that occurred since 1991, institutional and economic changes that ensued were 
perhaps even more important and arguably had an even bigger impact on wages.  
In summary, the fee-based dummy variable, Dfee, takes the value of 0 for 
individuals born before 1943 and 1 for individuals born in 1943 and after; this results in 
5.56% individuals falling into the 0 category and 94.44% into the 1 category. Given the 
similarity between this variable and D42, we choose the fee-based variable. Intuitively 
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Table A1: OLS Time Trends 
  
VARIABLES  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Education  0.0035 0.0062 0.0168 0.0061 0.0280*** 
  (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) 
Experience    -0.0010  0.0046 -0.0037  0.0016 0.0125 
  (0.010) (0.011) (0.012) (0.008) (0.010) 
Experience2  -0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0003 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Female  -0.4776*** -0.3060*** -0.2528**  -0.5365*** -0.4876*** 
  (0.104) (0.110) (0.127) (0.088) (0.101) 
Marriage    0.1483  0.2553*** 0.4716*** 0.1344  0.0452 
  (0.094) (0.098) (0.129) (0.084) (0.090) 
Female*Marriage  -0.0564  -0.4447*** -0.4714*** -0.0948  -0.1827 
  (0.124) (0.124) (0.140) (0.107) (0.113) 
Urban   0.1656**  0.2873***  0.1670**  0.1132*  0.0493 
  (0.068) (0.057) (0.065) (0.062) (0.057) 
Kaxeti
s    -0.4434*** -0.5308*** -0.7089*** -0.5215*** -0.5779*** 
  (0.121) (0.113) (0.116) (0.106) (0.092) 
Qvemo Qartli   -0.0864  0.0766  -0.1036  0.0135  -0.2908*** 
  (0.096) (0.082) (0.098) (0.092) (0.078) 
Samcxe    -1.1610*** -0.9117*** -0.6707*** -0.4554*** -0.4815*** 
  (0.134) (0.115) (0.124) (0.115) (0.103) 
Ajara    0.1063  -0.0506 -0.0910 -0.1507 -0.3067*** 
  (0.091) (0.091) (0.104) (0.099) (0.085) 
Guria    -0.6273*** -0.4398*** -0.5710*** -0.5297*** -0.8210*** 
  (0.118) (0.133) (0.108) (0.143) (0.125) 
Samegrelo    -0.4676*** -0.3594*** -0.4596*** -0.7647*** -0.7798*** 
  (0.108) (0.094) (0.109) (0.101) (0.097) 
Imereti    -0.5420*** -0.5862*** -0.4874*** -0.4251*** -0.4434*** 
  (0.096) (0.089) (0.089) (0.082) (0.080) 
Shida  Qartli    -0.3971*** -0.2406*** -0.4520*** -0.4047*** -0.5382*** 
  (0.103) (0.086) (0.087) (0.091) (0.096) 
Constant  4.1243*** 3.9865*** 3.9588*** 4.3057*** 4.2586*** 
  (0.206) (0.180) (0.197) (0.162) (0.169) 
Observations  1,105 1,152 964  1,236 1,300 
R-squared  0.215 0.275 0.263 0.221 0.250 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses  ; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1;
somitted category 
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Table A2: IV Time Trends (second stage results) 
VARIABLES pooled  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Education 0.0199**  0.0112  0.0441**  0.0047  0.0236  0.0218 
 (0.009)  (0.021)  (0.018)  (0.020)  (0.019)  (0.018) 
Experience   0.0037  0.0006  0.0003  0.0008  -0.0004  0.0139* 
 (0.004)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.011)  (0.008)  (0.008) 
Experience2 -0.0001*  -0.0001  -0.0001  -0.0001  -0.0000  -0.0003** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Female -0.4548***  -0.5421***  -0.3367***  -0.3290***  -0.4906***  -0.4726*** 
 (0.044)  (0.099)  (0.099)  (0.118)  (0.087)  (0.092) 
Marriage   0.1503***  0.0612  0.2392***  0.3602***  0.1092  0.0786 
 (0.041)  (0.090)  (0.087)  (0.119)  (0.080)  (0.084) 
Female*Marriage   -0.1962***  0.0034  -0.4394***  -0.3776***  -0.1392  -0.1346 
 (0.050)  (0.114)  (0.111)  (0.130)  (0.101)  (0.101) 
Urban   0.1299***  0.1444**  0.2864***  0.1665***  0.0313  -0.0145 
 (0.026)  (0.060)  (0.054)  (0.061)  (0.061)  (0.053) 
Kaxeti   -0.5529***  -0.4228***  -0.4822***  -0.6851***  -0.6196***  -0.6548*** 
 (0.046)  (0.115)  (0.110)  (0.109)  (0.104)  (0.087) 
Qvemo Qartli   -0.1212***  -0.0830  0.1289  -0.1410  -0.1692*  -0.3518*** 
 (0.040)  (0.094)  (0.084)  (0.099)  (0.096)  (0.078) 
Samcxe   -0.7192***  -1.0400***  -0.8380***  -0.7276***  -0.5116***  -0.5007*** 
 (0.054)  (0.129)  (0.111)  (0.114)  (0.112)  (0.101) 
Achara   -0.1286***  0.0592  -0.0410  -0.1118  -0.1675*  -0.4100*** 
 (0.041)  (0.093)  (0.087)  (0.104)  (0.089)  (0.082) 
Guria   -0.6009***  -0.5988***  -0.4100***  -0.6027***  -0.5905***  -0.8685*** 
 (0.054)  (0.117)  (0.130)  (0.107)  (0.139)  (0.120) 
Samegrelo   -0.5679***  -0.4363***  -0.3164***  -0.4748***  -0.8250***  -0.8706*** 
 (0.046)  (0.105)  (0.093)  (0.106)  (0.098)  (0.099) 
Imereti   -0.5121***  -0.5061***  -0.5121***  -0.5042***  -0.5015***  -0.5468*** 
 (0.038)  (0.094)  (0.090)  (0.092)  (0.078)  (0.075) 
Shida Qartli   -0.3750***  -0.4072***  -0.1798**  -0.4653***  -0.4074***  -0.5088*** 
 (0.039)  (0.103)  (0.091)  (0.089)  (0.082)  (0.079) 
D2001 0.0629*           
 (0.035)           
D2002 0.1838***           
 (0.036)           
D2003 0.1836***           
 (0.034)           
D2004 0.3673***           
 (0.033)           
Constant 3.8970***  4.0436***  3.4645***  4.1650***  4.1675***  4.3572*** 
 (0.135)  (0.329)  (0.279)  (0.326)  (0.277)  (0.274) 
Observations 5,757  1,105  1,152 964  1,236  1,300 
R-squared 0.236  0.217  0.267  0.259  0.209  0.233 
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Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Additional notes: 
Pooled: relevance, validity and exogeneity all pass 
2000: relevance passed, validity does not pass, exogeneity does (but since validity doesn’t unclear how 
reliable the result is) 
2001: relevance passes, validity passes; exogeneity does not pass (the results need to be corrected) 
2002: relevance passes, validity passes, exogeneity passes 
2003: relevance passes, validity passes, exogeneity passes 
2004: relevance passes, validity passes, exogeneity passes.   52
Table A3: Sample Selection Corrected Results (pooled regression) 
  Extended  Extended with Soviet and post-Soviet 
education 
Extended with Levels of Education 
VARIABLES  β  β 1  β 2  β  β 1  β 2  β  β 1  β 2 
  (1) (2)  (3)  (4) (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) (9) 
Eqn: lnw1m                
Education   0.0522***  0.0069  0.1592***             
 (0.017)  (0.005)  (0.005)             
Post-Soviet ed        0.0448**  0.0146  0.1182***       
       (0.018)  (0.011)  (0.011)       
Soviet educ        0.0484**  0.0072  0.1590***       
       (0.020)  (0.005)  (0.005)       
Secondary               0.1050  0.0699  0.1426*** 
             (0.066)  (0.062)  (0.049) 
Technical             0.1886**  0.0325  0.6315*** 
             (0.094)  (0.062)  (0.062) 
University               0.4020***  0.1006*  1.3175*** 
             (0.144)  (0.061)  (0.067) 
Female  -0.3966*** -0.4458***  0.0834**  -0.3976*** -0.4467***  0.0996**  -0.4020***  -0.4405*** 0.0499 
  (0.051) (0.048)  (0.042)  (0.052) (0.049)  (0.042)  (0.051)  (0.049) (0.041) 
Experience  0.0242** 0.0020  0.0777***  0.0199** 0.0065  0.0523***  0.0233**  0.0026  0.0723*** 
  (0.009) (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.010) (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.010)  (0.005) (0.004) 
Experience2 -0.0005***  -0.0002*  -0.0013***  -0.0004**  -0.0002*  -0.0009***  -0.0005***  -0.0002*  -0.0013*** 
  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Marriage  0.2260*** 0.1943***  0.1452***  0.2227*** 0.1937***  0.1452***  0.2190***  0.1948*** 0.1178*** 
  (0.048) (0.045)  (0.040)  (0.049) (0.045)  (0.040)  (0.048)  (0.045) (0.040) 
Female*Marriage  -0.3600*** -0.2364***  -0.4389***  -0.3500*** -0.2368***  -0.4403***  -0.3499***  -0.2364*** -0.4026*** 
  (0.076) (0.055)  (0.045)  (0.084) (0.055)  (0.045)  (0.077)  (0.055) (0.044) 
Urban    0.2745*** 0.1592***  0.4291***  0.2654*** 0.1603***  0.4288***  0.2631***  0.1605*** 0.3872*** 
  (0.050) (0.028)  (0.026)  (0.057) (0.028)  (0.026)  (0.049)  (0.028) (0.025) 
Regions yes yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
D2001  0.0579 0.0699*  -0.0277  0.0602 0.0680*  -0.0168  0.0575  0.0691*  -0.0004   53
  (0.040) (0.039)  (0.036)  (0.040) (0.039)  (0.036)  (0.040)  (0.039) (0.036) 
D2002  0.1672*** 0.1914***  -0.0469  0.1712*** 0.1885***  -0.0297  0.1730***  0.1872*** 0.0242 
  (0.040) (0.039)  (0.036)  (0.040) (0.039)  (0.036)  (0.040)  (0.039) (0.037) 
D2003  0.1513*** 0.1720***  -0.0387  0.1562*** 0.1665***  -0.0072  0.1552***  0.1693*** 0.0220 
  (0.039) (0.038)  (0.035)  (0.039) (0.038)  (0.036)  (0.039)  (0.038) (0.035) 
D2004  0.3426*** 0.3676***  -0.0174  0.3492*** 0.3608***  0.0244  0.3475***  0.3651*** 0.0490 
  (0.038) (0.037)  (0.035)  (0.038) (0.037)  (0.037)  (0.038)  (0.036) (0.035) 
NC16
a   -0.0079  0.0260*    -0.0056  0.0203    -0.0063  0.0214 
   (0.006)  (0.015)    (0.005)  (0.016)    (0.006)  (0.015) 
Female*NC16   0.0322**  -0.1059***    0.0316**  -0.1143***    0.0295**  -0.1006*** 
   (0.013)  (0.023)    (0.016)  (0.024)    (0.014)  (0.023) 
Constant  2.6899***     2.8367***     3.1688***     
  (0.513)     (0.582)     (0.386)     
                  
Eqn: select                   
NC16 0.0257*      0.0200      0.0243    
  (0.015)     (0.015)     (0.015)     
Female*NC16  -0.1049***     -0.1127***     -0.1071***     
  (0.022)     (0.022)     (0.022)     
gender  0.1600***     0.1754***     0.1330***     
  (0.038)     (0.039)     (0.039)     
Education   0.1474***                 
 (0.005)                 
Soviet Ed        0.1475***           
       (0.005)           
Post-Soviet Ed        0.1080***           
       (0.010)           
Secondary               0.1183***     
             (0.045)     
Technical             0.5403***     
             (0.047)     
University               1.0767***     
             (0.047)       54
Experience    0.0722***     0.0478***     0.0706***     
  (0.003)     (0.006)     (0.003)     
Experience2  -0.0012***     -0.0008***     -0.0012***     
  (0.000)     (0.000)     (0.000)     
Marriage    0.1028***     0.1032***     0.0798**     
  (0.039)     (0.039)     (0.040)     
Female 
*Marriage 
-0.3976***     -0.4002***     -0.3791***     
  (0.048)     (0.048)     (0.049)     
Urban    0.3748***     0.3752***     0.3493***     
  (0.024)     (0.024)     (0.024)     
Regions yes     yes     yes     
D2001  -0.0387     -0.0281     -0.0427     
  (0.034)     (0.034)     (0.034)     
D2002 -0.0782**      -0.0615*      -0.0525     
  (0.034)     (0.034)     (0.034)     
D2003 -0.0672**      -0.0366      -0.0523     
  (0.032)     (0.033)     (0.032)     
D2004 -0.0811***      -0.0415      -0.0640**     
  (0.031)     (0.033)     (0.032)     
Constant  -3.4505***     -3.1457***     -2.0723***     
  (0.075)     (0.102)     (0.063)     
Athrho 0.4915***      0.4474*      0.4729**     
  (0.190)     (0.230)     (0.201)     
Lnsigma  -0.1482**     -0.1610**     -0.1544**     
  (0.059)     (0.067)     (0.061)     
Observations  26,694 26,694  26,694  26,694 26,694  26,694  26,694  27,204 27,204 
  Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; 
aNC16 is the number of children under 16 
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Table A4: Sample Selection Corrected Results, by Year (extended specification with years of education) 
 2000  2001  2002  2003  2004 
VARIABLES  β  β 1  β 2  β  β 1  β 2  β  β 1  β 2  β  β 1  β 2  β  β 1  β 2 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13)  (14)  (15) 
E q :   l n w 1 m                          
Education    -0.0987***  0.0150  0.1656*** 0.0679*** -0.0005 0.1298*** -0.0011  0.0187*  0.1565***  0.0446**  0.0021  0.1763***  -0.0411** 0.0355***  0.1774*** 
  (0.017)  (0.011) (0.011) (0.017) (0.010)  (0.011) (0.017)  (0.010) (0.012)  (0.019)  (0.010)  (0.010) (0.017)  (0.009)  (0.010) 
Female -0.5510***  -0.4612***  0.0369  -0.2903**  -0.3755***  0.0851  -0.2865**  -0.2453* 0.2683***  -0.5257***  -0.5463***  -0.0202 -0.5471*** -0.4754***  0.0705 
  (0.121)  (0.105) (0.094) (0.122) (0.110)  (0.098) (0.136)  (0.127) (0.097)  (0.090)  (0.088)  (0.089) (0.104)  (0.098)  (0.090) 
Experience    -0.0534***  0.0033  0.0817*** 0.0487*** 0.0019  0.0893*** -0.0145  -0.0028  0.0899***  0.0148  0.0004  0.0596***  -0.0158  0.0138 0.0684*** 
  (0.012)  (0.010) (0.008) (0.014) (0.010)  (0.008) (0.015)  (0.012) (0.009)  (0.010)  (0.008)  (0.008) (0.012)  (0.009)  (0.008) 
Experience2 0.0008***  -0.0001  -0.0013***  -0.0010***  -0.0002  -0.0016*** 0.0002  -0.0000  -0.0016***  -0.0003  -0.0001  -0.0010***  0.0001 -0.0003* -0.0010*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Marriage    0.0712 0.1701* 0.1708* 0.3016***  0.2340**  0.1712* 0.4466***  0.4750***  0.2977***  0.1508*  0.1460*  0.0478 -0.0140  0.0329 0.1090 
  (0.110)  (0.093) (0.090) (0.107) (0.098)  (0.089) (0.134)  (0.128) (0.094)  (0.086)  (0.084)  (0.088) (0.094)  (0.089)  (0.089) 
Female*Marriage 0.2717*  -0.0488  -0.4310***  -0.6266***  -0.4344*** -0.4199***  -0.3893**  -0.4760***  -0.6616***  -0.1846  -0.1103  -0.3105*** -0.0071  -0.1735  -0.3774*** 
  (0.144)  (0.125) (0.100) (0.144) (0.123)  (0.106) (0.161)  (0.139) (0.097)  (0.118)  (0.108)  (0.099) (0.123)  (0.112)  (0.098) 
Urban    -0.1047  0.1689**  0.4179*** 0.4503*** 0.2734***  0.3874*** 0.1175  0.1713*** 0.4427***  0.2235***  0.1041*  0.5121***  -0.1088  0.0627 0.3927*** 
  (0.083)  (0.067) (0.057) (0.069) (0.057)  (0.055) (0.074)  (0.065) (0.062)  (0.078)  (0.062)  (0.058) (0.071)  (0.056)  (0.056) 
Regions  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
Children under 
16, NC16 
  -0.0135 -0.0221   -0.0033  0.0056    -0.0013 -0.0101    -0.0164  0.0648**    0.0180  0.0435 
    (0.022) (0.036)   (0.017)  (0.028)   (0.005) (0.043)    (0.013)  (0.033)   (0.016)  (0.036) 
Female*NC16    -0.0654** -0.1065**   0.0821***  -0.1392***   -0.0105  -0.0826    0.0338  -0.1334***    -0.0332  -0.0802 
    (0.031) (0.052)   (0.025)  (0.045)   (0.012) (0.059)    (0.021)  (0.045)   (0.021)  (0.050) 
Constant  7.2753***    1.7660***     4.5575***     3.1846***      6.3308***    
  (0.404)    (0.489)     (0.510)     (0.496)      (0.475)     
Eq:  selection                         
NC16  -0.0186    0.0059     -0.0093     0.0635*      0.0368    
  (0.030)    (0.030)     (0.040)     (0.033)      (0.031)     
Female  0.1233    0.1512*     0.3001***     0.0795      0.1468*    
  (0.087)    (0.089)     (0.091)     (0.082)      (0.080)     
Female*NC16  -0.0899**    -0.1457***     -0.0763     -0.1306***      -0.0678    
  (0.044)    (0.045)     (0.054)     (0.045)      (0.042)     
Education    0.1562***    0.1214***     0.1448***     0.1642***      0.1565***    
  (0.010)    (0.010)     (0.011)     (0.010)      (0.009)     
Experience    0.0779***    0.0831***     0.0856***     0.0556***      0.0604***    
  (0.007)    (0.008)     (0.008)     (0.007)      (0.007)     
experience2  -0.0012***    -0.0014***     -0.0015***     -0.0009***      -0.0009***    
  (0.000)    (0.000)     (0.000)     (0.000)      (0.000)     
Marriage    0.1354    0.1197     0.2061**     0.0186      0.0958    
  (0.087)    (0.088)     (0.095)     (0.083)      (0.081)       56
Female*Marriage  -0.4355***    -0.3381***     -0.6219***     -0.2849***      -0.3376***    
  (0.107)    (0.111)     (0.115)     (0.102)      (0.099)     
Urban    0.3752***    0.3135***     0.3918***     0.4617***      0.3506***    
  (0.055)    (0.051)     (0.058)     (0.053)      (0.050)     
Regions  yes    yes     yes     yes      yes    
Constant  -3.5981***    -3.1946***     -3.6476***     -3.6606***      -3.5195***    
  (0.162)    (0.163)     (0.184)     (0.161)      (0.145)     
Athrho    -1.1257***    0.9170***     -0.2256     0.4176**      -0.8476***    
  (0.135)    (0.173)     (0.177)     (0.170)      (0.175)     
LnSigma  0.1393***    -0.0026     -0.2380***     -0.1804***      -0.1043    
  (0.053)    (0.082)     (0.040)     (0.054)      (0.076)     
Observations  5,088  5,088 5,088 5,326 5,326  5,326 4,449  4,449 4,449  5,695  5,695  5,695  6,136  6,136 6,136 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; 
ab1  is the corrected education coefficient estimate; b2 is the conditional marginal effect of 
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Table A5: Sample Selection Corrected Results for the Returns to Soviet and post-Soviet Education, by Year 
  2000 2001 2002  2003  2004 
VARIABLES  β  β 1  β 2  β  β 1  β 2  β  β 1  β 2  β  β 1  β 2  β  β 1  β 2 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13) (14)  (15) 
Ew: lnw1m                      
Soviet  educ  -0.1001***  0.0133  0.1654*** 0.0664*** -0.0003  0.1298*** 0.0015  0.0183*  0.1555*** 0.0442** 0.0016  0.1770***  -0.0402** 0.0353***  0.1774*** 
  (0.017) (0.011) (0.011) (0.018) (0.010) (0.011) (0.016) (0.010) (0.012) (0.019)  (0.010)  (0.010) (0.018)  (0.009)  (0.010) 
Post-Soviet  educ  -0.0370  0.0488*  0.1329***  0.0413 0.0082 0.0661**  0.0125 0.0213 0.0830***  0.0399  0.0151  0.1057***  -0.0107  0.0303 0.0984*** 
  (0.034) (0.028) (0.025) (0.032) (0.030) (0.028) (0.031) (0.030) (0.029) (0.025)  (0.022)  (0.024) (0.027)  (0.024)  (0.024) 
Female  -0.5684*** -0.4676*** 0.0523  -0.2834**  -0.3755*** 0.1032 -0.2830**  -0.2442*  0.3003***  -0.5239***  -0.5513***  0.0081  -0.5470*** -0.4682***  0.0903 
  (0.121) (0.105) (0.094) (0.122) (0.111) (0.100) (0.135) (0.126) (0.099) (0.090)  (0.087)  (0.089) (0.104)  (0.099)  (0.090) 
Experience   -0.0255 0.0180  0.0661***  0.0342* 0.0062  0.0557***  -0.0068 -0.0015 0.0475***  0.0112  0.0098  0.0079  0.0082  0.0099 0.0055 
  (0.017) (0.015) (0.013) (0.018) (0.015) (0.015) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018)  (0.017)  (0.017) (0.020)  (0.018)  (0.018) 
experience2    0.0003  -0.0004 -0.0011***  -0.0008**  -0.0003 -0.0010 0.0000  -0.0001 -0.0009***  -0.0003  -0.0003  -0.0001  -0.0003  -0.0003 0.0000 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (.)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) 
Marriage    0.0692  0.1674*  0.1697*  0.2963*** 0.2343**  0.1635*  0.4526*** 0.4775*** 0.3027*** 0.1483*  0.1447* 0.0424  -0.0056  0.0382 0.1044 
  (0.110) (0.093) (0.089) (0.106) (0.099) (0.089) (0.133) (0.128) (0.093) (0.086)  (0.084)  (0.088) (0.094)  (0.089)  (0.089) 
Female*Marriage  0.2790*  -0.0450  -0.4358*** -0.6244*** -0.4388*** -0.4166*** -0.4014**  -0.4767*** -0.6683*** -0.1856  -0.1110  -0.3122*** -0.0129  -0.1760  -0.3752*** 
  (0.144) (0.124) (0.100) (0.144) (0.125) (0.106) (0.159) (0.139) (0.097) (0.118)  (0.108)  (0.099) (0.124)  (0.112)  (0.099) 
Urban    -0.0973  0.1747*** 0.4179*** 0.4454*** 0.2743*** 0.3846*** 0.1248*  0.1711*** 0.4450*** 0.2249***  0.1051* 0.5148***  -0.1060 0.0641  0.3951*** 
  (0.083) (0.067) (0.057) (0.070) (0.057) (0.055) (0.072) (0.065) (0.061) (0.078)  (0.062)  (0.058) (0.071)  (0.056)  (0.056) 
Regions yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
NC16      -0.0135 -0.0221   0.0001  -0.0002   -0.0024 -0.0223   -0.0132  0.0524    0.0119 0.0292 
    (0.022) (0.036)   (0.016) (0.028)   (0.005) (0.043)   (0.012)  (0.033)   (0.016)  (0.037) 
Female*NC16    -0.0675** -0.1103**   0.0866*** -0.1511***    -0.0102 -0.0936   0.0372*  -0.1471***    -0.0383*  -0.0937* 
    (0.031) (0.052)   (0.025) (0.046)   (0.012) (0.059)   (0.022)  (0.045)   (0.022)  (0.050) 
Constant  6.9373***    2.0019***    4.3884***    3.2395***      5.9795***     
  (0.422)    (0.476)    (0.465)    (0.485)      (0.484)     
E q n :   s e l e c t                       
Post-Soviet  Educ  0.1185***    0.0605**    0.0751***    0.0963***      0.0853***     
  (0.024)    (0.026)    (0.027)    (0.022)      (0.021)     
Soviet  Educ  0.1565***    0.1219***    0.1446***    0.1654***      0.1571***     
  (0.010)    (0.010)    (0.011)    (0.010)      (0.009)     
NC16  -0.0187    -0.0002    -0.0208    0.0514      0.0248     
  (0.030)    (0.030)    (0.040)    (0.033)      (0.032)     
Female  0.1391    0.1683*    0.3317***    0.1066      0.1639**     
  (0.088)    (0.091)    (0.094)    (0.083)      (0.081)     
Female*NC16  -0.0932**    -0.1583***    -0.0872    -0.1444***      -0.0797*     
  (0.044)    (0.047)    (0.055)    (0.045)      (0.042)     
Experience    0.0601***    0.0512***    0.0454***    0.0057      0.0034     
  (0.013)    (0.014)    (0.015)    (0.015)      (0.016)     
Experience2    -0.0009***    -0.0009***    -0.0008***    -0.0000      0.0001       58
  (0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)      (0.000)     
Marriage    0.1351    0.1130    0.2124**    0.0138      0.0909     
  (0.087)    (0.088)    (0.095)    (0.083)      (0.082)     
Female*Marriage  -0.4420***    -0.3362***    -0.6340***    -0.2876***      -0.3364***     
  (0.107)    (0.113)    (0.117)    (0.103)      (0.100)     
Urban    0.3746***    0.3125***    0.3960***    0.4655***      0.3539***     
  (0.055)    (0.051)    (0.058)    (0.053)      (0.051)     
Regions  yes    yes    yes    yes      yes    
Constant  -3.3799***    -2.7751***    -3.1143***    -3.0063***      -2.7483***     
  (0.209)    (0.228)    (0.261)    (0.244)      (0.250)     
Athrho    -1.1210***    0.8886***    -0.1920    0.4155**      -0.8325***     
  (0.136)    (0.185)    (0.168)    (0.171)      (0.178)     
LnSigma  0.1364**    -0.0140    -0.2428***    -0.1811***      -0.1106     
  (0.054)    (0.086)    (0.037)    (0.054)      (0.077)     
Observations  5,088 5,088 5,088 5,326 5,326 5,326 4,449 4,449 4,449 5,695  5,695  5,695  6,136  6,136  6,136 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; 
ab1  is the corrected education coefficient estimate; b2 is the conditional marginal effect of 
education on the log of wages; b3 is the unconditional marginal effect of education on the log of wages.  59
 